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What’s Left of the Italian Right?
MARCO TARCHI
Another Anomaly of Italian Politics
Defining which parties may be gathered under the label of the Right within the 
Italian political system has never been, since 1945, an easy task. As the best known of 
the historians of Italian fascism, Renzo De Felice, wrote thirty years after the fall of 
Mussolini’s regime, 
”In Italy, the political struggle is so singular that a right wing of a classic tra-
ditional type, that is, a respectable, law-and-order (perbenistica) right, is unthinkable 
because it would be soon accused to be a fascist one”1.
As a matter of fact, because of the widespread association of every form of avowed 
strong conservatism and/or nationalism to the fascist ideology, along the whole 
course of the so-called First Republic (1946-1993) all the moderate parties – including 
the Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI), the main heir of the pre-fascist ”historical Right” 
– carefully avoided to use and accept that label. Even the notion of Centre-Right, 
today so popular in the Italian political language, was banned. For a long period, the 
absence of a legitimate right-wing political force on the political setting was one of 
the components of the ”Italian anomaly” discussed by many political scientists. And 
the only party that tried (not without internal disagreements) to occupy this portion 
of the electoral political space was, after the meteoric irruption of the proto-populist 
Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque2, the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). It is a fact 
that this party, described by Giovanni Sartori as one of the two ”anti-system” wings 
of the Italian ”polarized pluralism”3 and generally considered as the most prominent 
member of the Extreme Right European family, until 1993 was the only political force 
that was ready to describe itself as the representative of the Italian Right, and if one 
wants to ascertain what is left of the Right in Italy today, first of all he has to analyze 
the ”long march through the institutions”4 that the MSI has performed all along its 
life, extender over nearly half a century (December 1946-January 1995).
Taking part in democratic politics in the Italian post-war period was a hard 
task for those who looked upon the fascist past as a symbol of honor and openly 
denounced the armed Resistance to the Mussolini’s Repubblica Sociale Italiana fostered 
by the rebel fighting bands during the 1943-1945 civil war as the Trojan Horse of the 
Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), strictly associated with Soviet communism. None of 
1 Renzo DE FELICE, Intervista sul fascismo, Laterza, Bari, 1975, p. 97.
2 On this flash-party, see Sandro SETTA, L’Uomo qualunque 1944-1948, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 
2005, and Marco TARCHI, L’Italia populista. Dal qualunquismo ai girotondi, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2003, pp. 75-93.
3 See Giovanni SARTORI, Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, SugarCo, Milano, 1982, pp. 7-44.
4 See Piero IGNAZI, Il polo escluso, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987.
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the five party leaders1 succeeded in resolving this contradiction prior to the beginning 
of the 1990s. This does not mean that during the course of its history, which was 
finished in January 1995 with the 17th congress decreeing the party transformation 
into another political actor, Alleanza Nazionale, the MSI did not achieve tangible 
results. Despite of the official anti-fascist consensus which had laid the basis of the 
republican establishment, in the Cold War era the MSI, because of its strong anti-
communist stances, was seen by some conservative circles and sectors of the public 
opinion as a potential ally of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC), but its attempts to achieve 
a coalition potential always failed. The party played in some occasions a substantial 
role, providing support for the election of two presidents of the republic (Antonio 
Segni and Giovanni Leone) and capturing a not negligible share of the protest vote, 
that made of it the fourth largest party in Parliament. Nevertheless, the lack of 
democratic legitimacy inscribed into its fascist chromosomes served to severely limit 
its political ambitions.
In addition, the nature of the MSI as an anti-system party (more so in its culture 
and programs rather than its methods) was essential in creating the ”triangle 
of illegitimacy”2 that made the political Centre, i.e. the DC, the linchpin of Italian 
politics. In that context the MSI was assigned a subordinate role, being occasionally 
co-opted when it served the DC’s purposes, and it was excluded from government 
due to the Christian Democrats’ need to appear as the main political bulwark against 
the Left. However, in spite of the modest leverage it had in the system, the party 
contributed to undermine the credibility of any possible alternation in government 
between the Left and the Right and it favored the existence of a blocked system of 
party competition based on a conditional co-option of the ”extremes” – in general, 
the PCI – in decision-making processes. The objective of this centrist strategy was to 
create a form of consociationalism that used anti-fascism as its cornerstone.
Given this situation and the nostalgic bent of the MSI after its unsuccessful 
attempts to insert itself into the dynamics of coalition building, it may seem odd that 
the party never renounced the prospect of making a comeback. In the 1990 regional 
elections, the share of its vote dropped to 3.9 per cent, its worst electoral result since 
1948. However, due to its consistent exclusion from power at national and local level 
and its general image of being a different party from the others, only three years later 
the MSI underwent a rapid change in its fortunes. Its forced abstinence from power, 
which had limited its resources and prevented it from establishing solid relations of 
exchange with economic and social interest groups, was transformed into fortunate 
coincidence when the cyclone of moral indignation hit the ruling class of the First 
Republic in connection with the ”Clean Hands” investigation. The weight of anti-
fascist discrimination, already eroded by the passage of time, was further reduced 
because many leaders who had paid lip service to this principle were implicated in the 
1 The charismatic feature that the fascist mentality ascribes to the leadership generally 
allowed the MSI national secretaries to exert power for long periods: Giorgio Almirante led the 
party for over twenty years (1946-1950 and 1969-1987), Arturo Michelini for fifteen (from 1954 
to his death in 1969), Gianfranco Fini for six (1987-1989 and 1991-1995), before becoming the 
president of the Alleanza Nazionale, from its birth to its extinction (1995-2008). The only excep-
tions were the secretaries of Augusto De Marsanich (1950-1954) and Pino Rauti (1990-1991). 
2 See Roberto CHIARINI, ”La Destra italiana. Il paradosso di un’identità illegittima”, Italia 
contemporanea, no. 185, 1991, pp. 582-600.
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corruption scandals. In addition, the growth of the anti-politician1 backlash brought 
on by Tangentopoli favored the re-admission into the national political arena of those 
political ”exiles in their own country”2 who in December 1946 had gathered around 
the symbol of the tricolored flame to keep alive the memory of fascism.
In the course of only two years (1993-1994) the dynamics of the Italian party system 
drastically changed, owing to the combined effect of two leading factors: the loss of 
legitimacy of the ruling political élite, involved in a large network of corruption and 
prosecuted by the judges, and the introduction of a new electoral law based mainly 
on the plurality principle. The disintegration of the DC and of the other centre parties 
made it possible for the neo-fascist party to come out of the ghetto where it had been 
confined and to be accepted by Silvio Berlusconi as an important partner for his new 
Centre-Right electoral cartel.
Alleanza Nazionale: 
from the ”Custom clearance” to the Government
The base for this unexpected outcome was the coming together of new rules for 
the election of city mayors (for the first time they would have been directly chosen 
by the voters) and the first effects of the Tangentopoli investigations. The collapse of 
their organizations under the pressure of the judiciary forced the centre parties to 
propose local candidates with little stature or without political and/or administrative 
experience. The moral disqualification and the organizational weakness of the previous 
governing parties encouraged a number of moderate and conservative voters to shift 
their support to two ”anti-establishment” challengers: the Lega Nord in the northern 
regions and the MSI in the centre-southern ones. The logic of the two-ballot system 
increased the size of the phenomenon to the point of electing MSI mayors in 33 towns 
with more than 15.000 inhabitants, four of which were provincial capitals: Benevento, 
Caltanissetta, Chieti and Latina. It is evident that, presented with the alternative of 
voting either for a candidate from the Left or one from the ”extreme” Right, many ex-
supporters of the DC and other centrist parties preferred to vote for the latter.
On 21 November 1993, in Rome and Naples, where the MSI lists had gained 
more than 30 per cent of the vote during the first round, its candidates for mayor – the 
national secretary Gianfranco Fini, and the grand-daughter of the duce, Alessandra 
Mussolini – were admitted to the second ballot. Even if they were not successful, 
the amount of the vote they received (respectively 46.9 and 44.4 per cent) was a 
shock both for the political élite and for the media. The simultaneous collapse of the 
mainstream parties made it clear that the MSI, perceived as being outside the so-
called ”constitutional arch”, emerged as front-runner against the Left dominated by 
former Communists. Silvio Berlusconi, who was preparing his entry into the political 
competition, was the first to subscribe this view by endorsing Fini’s candidature as 
1 We prefer to refer to anti-politician rather than anti-party sentiments because the latter 
were extensively diffused among the public even prior to the explosion of the Mani Pulite 
scandal, which brought these sentiments to bear against other institutions, such as the civil 
service. On this topic, see Leonardo MORLINO, Marco TARCHI, ”The Dissatisfied Society: The 
Roots of Political Change in Italy”, European Journal of Political Research, no. 30, 1996, pp. 41-63.
2 See Marco TARCHI, Esuli in patria. I fascisti nell’Italia repubblicana, Guanda, Milano, 1995.
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mayor of Rome between the ballots. The media described that choice as a crucial 
”custom clearance” (sdoganamento) of the party.
At that point, a significant number of the pre-conditions for the passage of the 
MSI from its traditional role as a right-wing protest party to a more constructive role 
had been established. In the first place, the electoral space available to the party had 
increased. The diffusion of a majoritarian political perspective, sustained by public 
opinion and the media, set the stage for the need to choose between Left and Right and 
the MSI was in position to occupy one of these political positions by itself. Secondly, 
some of the impediments which had for a long time restricted the party’s ability to 
attract voters disappeared. On the one hand, the fall of the Soviet Union reduced the fear 
of communism of many conservative voters and enticed them to abandon their atavistic 
support of the DC. On the other hand, the explosion of the corruption scandal reduced 
the DC’s capacity to engage in patronage, thereby releasing a large part of its supporters 
into the electoral marketplace. Millions of voters were once again potentially available. 
Finally, the gap of democratic legitimacy was overcome. In fact, the search for new and 
credible parties to rule the country turned the MSI’s previous shortcomings into positive 
characteristics. Given that the party had been kept at the margins of the political system, 
it was not contaminated by corruption and public patronage in the eyes of the public. 
Its lack of organizational and programmatic renewal was now presented by the party 
leadership as a refuse to become involved in jockeying for personal advantages which 
has been associated with the former governing parties, especially the Partito Socialista 
Italiano (PSI). Its nationalist and authoritarian proclivity was interpreted as a guarantee 
of responsibility and respect for the national interest.
The success of the party at the 1993 municipal elections pushed the MSI 
leadership to moderate its approach by enforcing the process of integration into 
the democratic system long initiated but never completed. The attempt to create a 
wider political movement in order to acquire those voters which were ideologically 
oriented toward the Right, but which had remained within the DC due to the Cold 
War logic, had remained a constant in MSI strategy. What was different this time were 
the surrounding political conditions. The temptation of highly-principled isolation 
had already brought harm to the Lega Nord, whose candidates had been defeated by 
the opposing electoral bloc in almost all the cities of the North (with the sole exception 
of Milan) in 1993. The defeats (even if narrow) of Fini and Mussolini in the mayoral 
elections represented another alarm bell. It was on this basis that the proposal made 
months before by the political scientist Domenico Fisichella1, who had proposed the 
regeneration of the Right through a renewal of its image and political program to 
counterbalance the formation of a ”Democratic Alliance” by the Centre-Left parties, 
gathered momentum. In order to become reality, the proposal needed to find valid 
interlocutors who could make the reorganization of the right-wing of the political 
spectrum credible. For a party which in the past had emphasized the importance of 
identity and belonging, such a change was not easy, and when the idea was launched, 
very few independent personalities decided to join. The inaugural meeting of Alleanza 
Nazionale, the 22 January 1994, did not witness the birth of a new political formation, 
or the embryo of a federation, but only a new label under which the diffused territorial 
organization of the MSI could operate.
1 See Adalberto BALDONI, Storia della destra. Dal postfascismo al popolo della libertà, Vallecchi, 
Firenze, 2009, pp. 287-289.
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For the party leadership, the change of name and symbol was basically a tactical 
and instrumental move, intended to set up a ”Great Right” as Arturo Michelini, the 
most moderate leader of the party, had tried to do in vain in the sixties by addressing 
to royalists and liberals1. So, at the beginning the new label was simply added to the 
traditional name, to form the MSI-Alleanza Nazionale, but even in this limited way, 
the change was not well accepted by all the middle-level élite and partisans, always 
involved in sharp confrontation between different factions2. The change had been 
neither preceded nor prepared by a critical discussion of the neo-fascist experience, 
and AN leaders frequently paid public homage to the ”glorious” struggle of their 
forefathers. They exhibited a full allegiance to democracy, but the echoes of the neo-
fascist rhetoric were frequent in the party press. The leadership had to try and resolve 
a complicated dilemma: how to maintain the adherence of both party militants and 
the staff of the MSI, essential for the proper function of the organizational machinery 
which now appeared under the new banner, while at the same time renouncing a 
constituent part of the symbolic ideological resources that had previously motivated 
the members to work for the party. But without such a change, to maintain the 
consensus of that part of the electorate that had chosen for the first time the MSI 
candidates at the 1993 local elections on the wave of the ”First Republic” collapse, 
would have been rather impossible.
What allowed Alleanza Nazionale to overcome the probable impasse was the 
unexpected appearance of Forza Italia. The entry of Silvio Berlusconi as an aspiring 
Prime Minister and head of a new party served to increase the crisis of the Italian 
political system and to attract the polemical attacks of the Left. Covered by the presence 
of Berlusconi, Fini was allowed to concentrate on presenting a calm and balanced 
image which induced some of the leaders of the progressive coalition to recognize 
his democratic credentials in a manner as would have been unthinkable before. The 
change in attitude of the most important party of the Left, the Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra (PDS), reinforced the appearance of a transformation that, in reality, still had 
to take place. Despite the fact that for the moment it was only an electoral cartel born 
”by gemmation” from the trunk of the MSI3, the media referred to Alleanza Nazionale 
as if this new party already existed. In news broadcasts and newspapers reports, Fini 
became ”the coordinator of the National Alliance”.
The agreement with Forza Italia, the Unione di Centro and the Centro Cristiano 
Democratico (CCD) to present common candidates in a large part of the constituencies 
of the central and southern regions under the banner of the Polo del Buongoverno 
(Good Government Pole) at the March 1994 general elections, represented another 
step toward full legitimization for the MSI-AN that would be fully rewarded by the 
electoral results. With 5.202.398 votes for the Chamber of Deputies (13.5%), the party 
achieved an historical triumph. But the range of its importance within the winning 
alliance cannot be measured only by this statistic. What was also important was the 
1 See Piero IGNAZI, Postfascisti?, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994; Piero IGNAZI, ”La resurrezione 
postfascista”, Il Mulino, vol. XLIII, no. 6, 1994, pp. 853-862.
2 On the internal struggles of the MSI, see Marco TARCHI, Cinquant’anni di nostalgia. La 
destra italiana dopo il fascismo, Rizzoli, Milano, 1995; Marco TARCHI, Dal Msi ad An. Organizzazione 
e strategie, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1997.
3 The suggestive and appropriate image has been proposed by Ilvo DIAMANTI, ”Partiti 
modelli”, Almanacco 1995 di Politica ed Economia, Special Issue, 1995, pp. 71-79. 
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attractive power of its candidates1, the encouraging results achieved in many electoral 
districts of the North in competition with the Pole of Liberty lists (from which it 
was excluded due to the opposition from the Lega Nord) and the defeats sustained 
by the moderate alliance in areas such as Abruzzo and Campania, where Alleanza 
Nazionale was not allowed to join the list due to internal conflicts. With 109 deputies 
and 48 senators, the MSI-AN made its first foray into government, and obtained five 
ministers and twelve under-secretaries in the cabinet.
The Right and the Centre-Right:
Allies and Competitors
Despite the fact that the electoral success was organized exclusively by the 
old leadership and that the number of independents elected on the party lists in 
1994 was less than the percentage elected in 19922, the new situation emphasized 
once again the need to transform the party. Entering a government whose program 
differed significantly from MSI’s political culture – this party had always criticized 
liberal society and consumerism – the MSI-AN felt the need to differentiate itself in 
order to maintain its own identity. It tried to do it by projecting itself as the ”social 
conscience” of the coalition, but this was possible only because it had at its disposal 
a party organization that derived its inspiration from neo-fascist roots and ideals. 
Moving the emphasis toward new members who had been attracted to the party 
by the electoral victory did not resolve the contradiction, though the fact that the 
new members were driven more by ”careerist” than by ”idealistic” motivations3 
certainly provided the basis for a gradual de-ideologicization of politics within an 
organization that had conserved a strong emotional and ”sacred” conception of its 
identity.
Forced to look for cooperation, the party, unused to this practice, had early 
difficulties in the relations with new allies. During its eight months in government, 
the problem of the party’s dual nature re-emerged in various forms. The leadership 
clearly wanted to reassure that conspicuous part of its electorate were oriented toward 
the Centre and that the party no longer looked back to fascism for its inspiration. At 
other times though, the party reverted to positions which were more in line with its 
old political orientations. This incoherent behaviour contributed to the irresolution of 
the governmental action. With the passing of time, it was clear that the MSI-AN and 
the Lega Nord disliked one another, and disagreed on many proposed policies. So, 
the heterogeneous coalition formed by Berlusconi just before the elections in order to 
1 Stefano BARTOLINI, Roberto D’ALIMONTE, ”La competizione maggioritaria: le origini 
elettorali del parlamento diviso”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. XXIV, no. 3, 1994, 
pp. 631-686, show that in single-members districts the MSI-AN candidates running under the 
banner of the Good Government Pole attracted more votes than did the separate party lists 
MSI-AN had joined for the proportional vote: the average was 37.8 to 34.5 per cent.
2 See Luca VERZICHELLI, ”Gli eletti”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. XXIV, no. 3, 
1994, pp. 715-739.
3 The distinction between carrieristi (careerists) and credenti (true believers) within the 
party organization has been proposed by Angelo PANEBIANCO, Modelli di partito, Il Mulino, 
Bologna 1982; English translation: Political Parties, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-
New York, 1988.
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prevent the success of the Left proved unable to overcome its internal contradictions 
and the first Berlusconi cabinet collapsed after only seven months.
Once again in the opposition, the MSI-AN was forced to take an another 
step forward in order not to lose the conspicuous resources recently gained. The 
reinforcement of the relationship with Forza Italia, encouraged by the need to reconstruct 
a central axis of the Centre-Right coalition after the exit of the Lega Nord, was an 
integral part of the party’s strategy of presenting itself as a responsible political force 
firmly anchored on the Right, but not at all subversive of the democratic system. The 
question, raised especially abroad, over the so-called ”rebirth of fascism” represented 
by the access of ”post-fascists” to power, pushed Fini to actively try to transform the 
party’s image by dropping its original ideology. In preparing this turn, the MSI-AN 
secretary made use of his increased credibility and the highly centralized structure 
of the party organization. Fini presented the theses of the upcoming ”foundational” 
congress – the so-called Fiuggi Theses – without a preliminary internal debate and 
used them as a test of the party’s unquestioned support of the leader. The purpose of 
the theses was to represent a radical break with the past and therefore to attract the 
attention of the media and to stimulate debate both among the public opinion and the 
political class. The echo raised by this Manifesto was actually large, but the judgments 
of the informed commentators were divided and many party cadres expressed their 
perplexity when faced some radical departures like the inclusion of Benedetto Croce 
and Antonio Gramsci as part of the cultural heritage assumed by AN or the statement 
that the Right to which the new party declared to belong was not ”a by-product 
of Fascism”. However, the process of evolution went on and the Congress held in 
Fiuggi on 25-29 January 1995 sanctioned the end of MSI and transformed it into 
an autonomous political subject, Alleanza Nazionale. Having put out the traditional 
”tricolor flame”, Fini placed a reduced version of it in the new symbol.
In fact, at that moment the change was more cosmetic than real, because there 
was an identifiable continuity with the MSI, but it nevertheless represented a new 
phenomenon in the history of the Right. For the first time since 1945, the Right enjoyed 
a central role in the Italian political system. Having overturned the status as a pariah 
party and following their leader’s decision, almost all members accepted the change 
necessary to pursuit their ideals. Only one of the historical leaders, Pino Rauti, former 
secretary of the party in 1990-91, opposed this decision and founded the Movimento 
Sociale-Fiamma tricolore in strong continuity with the MSI. But in doing so he helped Fini 
by drawing a clear line between supporters of the new project and diehard fascists.
The limits of the transformation were evident. The ”new” party did not have a 
statute. The congress only approved the first four articles, which gave all powers to 
the president, a position to which Fini was elected by acclamation. An overwhelming 
majority of delegates came from the MSI, and the national leadership of AN nominated 
by the president himself included almost all the members of the old MSI ”inner circle”. 
However, Fini tried to emphasize the originality of this innovation. In his view, the 
final motion approved by the Fiuggi Congress represented an important step to 
break with the past, by claiming to ”embrace the democratic values that fascism had 
denied”1, but it was not enough to achieve AN’s political legitimization at large. Party 
1 Tesi politiche per il XVII Congresso Nazionale del MSI-DN, ”Pensiamo l’Italia, il domani 
c’è già. Valori, idee e progetti per l’Alleanza Nazionale”, supplement to the MSI newspaper 
Secolo d’Italia, 7.12.1994, p. 8.
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position was considered contradictory. Some observers suggested that it was simply 
a mimetic version of classic neo-fascism1. Others detected signs of transformation, 
though not sufficient to abandon the fascist brand to define the ideological hybrid 
that Fini and his party were elaborating2, and emphasized the illiberal imprinting of 
many ideological references of the text, aimed solely to ”create the illusion of a core 
change in ideology and programs”3. According to the data from a survey conducted 
among the party delegates at the Programmatic Conference held three years after the 
foundational congress4, they still displayed contradictory political attitudes towards 
that past which had inspired the creation of the MSI.
Besides the problem of (re-)defining its identity after the return to opposition, 
AN was confronted to crucial external challenges. Overshadowed by the personality 
of Berlusconi, its leadership gave new priority to concerns about differentiating the 
party from its allies. Assuming that Forza Italia could quickly fall apart, Fini and the 
members of his team progressively moved to more moderate positions, showing off 
that the policy of the Italian Right was oriented toward the Centre, although an inner 
faction, Destra sociale (social Right), led by two influential cadres of the party machine, 
Gianni Alemanno and Francesco Storace5, kept the traditional political culture of MSI 
alive. In 1996, after the crisis of the technical cabinet led by Lamberto Dini, against 
its allies’ attempts of mediation, AN called for early election, thus obtaining the best 
result in its history (15.7%), but due to its competition with the MS-FT (not admitted in 
Berlusconi’s coalition because of a veto put by Fini)6, the Centre-Right was defeated.
From that moment onwards, Alleanza Nazionale competed strongly against Forza 
Italia, trying to establish an hegemony on the moderate electorate. Riffles arose mainly 
over the reform of the judiciary and the choice of a new model of government, with AN 
showing its favor for a Presidential Republic while FI preferred a strengthening of the 
powers of Prime Minister. Some other points of dissent arose when the general frame 
1 See, for instance, Peter H. MERKL, ”Introduction”, in Peter H. MERKL, Leonard 
WEINBERG (eds.), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, Frank Cass, London-
Portland 1997, pp. 1-15; Stephen SCHEINBERG, ”Conclusion”, in Aurel BRAUN, Stephen 
SCHEINBERG (eds.), The Extreme Right. Freedom and Security at Risk, Westview Press, Boulder, 
2001, pp. 250-257.
2 See Roger GRIFFIN, ”The ʼ Post-fascismʼ of the Alleanza nazionale: A Case Study in Ideolo-
gical Morphology”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. I, no. 2, 1996, pp. 123-145.
3 Piero IGNAZI, ”La resurrezione postfascista”, cit., p. 856; see also Gianfranco BALDINI, 
Rinaldo VIGNATI, ”Dal Msi ad An: una nuova cultura politica?”, Polis, vol. X, no. 1, 1996, 
pp. 81-101.
4 See Simone BERTOLINO, Flavio CHIAPPONI, ”I militanti di Alleanza Nazionale: ancora 
ʼEsuli in Patriaʼ?”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, vol. VIII, no. 2, 1999, pp. 211-249.
5 Gianni Alemanno, for a long period very close to Pino Rauti, had been national secretary 
of the MSI youth organization Fronte della Gioventù from 1988 to 1991. Later he was deputy 
(1994-2013), Minister of Agriculture (2001-2006) and mayor of Rome (2008-2013); Francesco 
Storace, after a period as Gianfranco Fini’s spokesman, was deputy (1994-2000), President of 
Lazio Region (2000-2005), Minister of Health (2005-2006) and senator (2006-2008).
6 The MS-FT gained 629.522 votes (1,7%) for the Chamber of Deputies and 748.759 (2,3%) 
for the Senate, even if it was not able to present candidates in some districts. This result was 
enough to cause the defeat of the Centre-Right coalition in many districts (36 for the Chamber of 
Deputies, 26 for the Senate). See Roberto D’ALIMONTE, Stefano BARTOLINI, ”Come perdere 
una maggioranza. La competizione nei collegi uninominali”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 
vol. XXVI, no. 3, 1996, pp. 655-701. 
701
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 4 • 2013
What’s Left of the Italian Right?
of a Constitutional reform was discussed by a special parliamentary commission. 
The new party ideology, highlighted in the lengthy document presented at the 1998 
Programmatic Conference1, stated liberalism in economy and conservative positions 
on ethical issues, a strategy aimed at attracting moderates. If between 1995 and 1997 
the party had sought to become a radical force of renewal of the Italian political 
system, determined to undertake a complete replacement of the political class and 
a reform of institutions inspired by a model of direct democracy, now it presented 
itself as an advocate of modernization. During the first phase of its life, the political 
culture of AN had assumed features of populism, of a ”party of civil society”, an 
alternative to the establishment that would nevertheless correct society’s distortions 
within the existing framework. Between 1998 and 2000, it showed a conversion to the 
free market and the primacy of individual initiative, but at the same time declared 
to aim to protect national identity against the secessionist tendencies fostered by the 
Northern League and of traditional morals against corruption. This was the phase 
of a ”national-liberal” project aiming to regain some of the electoral ground won by 
Forza Italia.
Moving to the Centre, however, AN run the risk of leaving room on its Right to its 
competitors; and that space was attractive not only for the Extreme Right but also for 
the Lega Nord and Forza Italia. While in its search for legitimacy Alleanza Nazionale after 
the fall of the first Berlusconi cabinet had carefully avoided to adopt open populist 
stances, its competitors were aware of the large electoral potential of populism and 
adopted its style and discourse2. The attitude toward the Left was another matter of 
dissent. According to Fini, the era of anti-communism and ideological conflicts that 
had plagued the nineteenth century was over, whereas Berlusconi stressed his strong 
aversion to communism gaining the favour of the AN militants, who gradually were 
renouncing the original matrix3. At the same time, Alleanza Nazionale established a 
cooperation with Mario Segni, a former Christian Democrat who had launched some 
years before a movement to reform the political system through the use of instruments 
of direct democracy, and some members of the Radical Party to promote a referendum 
on the electoral law which culminated in the formation of a joint-list at the 1999 
European Parliament election. The poor outcome of both initiatives (non-quorum 
referendum and only 10.3% in the elections) confirmed the failure of this strategy of 
emphasized differentiation from Forza Italia and reinforced confrontational stances 
within the party.
The Return to the Government
The crisis of the centre-left governments since 1998 re-launched the necessity of 
unifying the opposition. Despite the harsh confrontation in previous years, Alleanza 
Nazionale did not refuse an alliance with the Lega Nord and it registered the Centre-
Right coalition’s success in April 2000 regional elections (which determined the 
1 ”Rimetti in cammino la speranza dell’Italia”. Documento della prima Conferenza 
Programmatica di Alleanza Nazionale, Verona, 27 febbraio-1 marzo 1998.
2 See Marco TARCHI, L’Italia populista...cit.
3 See Roberto CHIARINI, Marco MARAFFI, (eds.), La destra allo specchio. La cultura politica 
di Alleanza nazionale, Marsili, Venezia, 2001.
702
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 4 • 2013
MARCO TARCHI
collapse of the D’Alema cabinet, the first led by a former communist), showing that 
the AN’s hopes of drawing voters away from Forza Italia were waned: Berlusconi’s party 
obtained 25.6% versus AN’s 13.1%. However, the Alliance acquired a higher number 
of regional councilors and assessors, and gained the Presidency of two regions, Lazio 
and Abruzzo. The increase in the number of party representatives in local government 
and the progressive professionalization of the party’s intermediate staff favored the 
definitive transition from a party of true ”believers”, as the MSI had always been, 
to a party of more pragmatic ”careerists”. Notwithstanding the dramatic increase in 
the number of members officially declared by the party until to 467.539 in 1995, the 
party was characterized by an emphasis on its presence ”in public office” rather than 
”on the ground”1, through a large number of promotions to positions of power in the 
public sector. It was even more clear that the positions expressed in the programmatic 
documents presented at the AN Naples conference of February 2001 with the leitmotif 
of the ”Destra di governo”2 aimed to shift towards moderate tendencies3.
The 2001 elections confirmed the regressive trend of AN, which obtained only 
12%, confronted to FI’s 29.4%, but allowed the party to acquire ministerial positions 
in the Berlusconi’s second cabinet and the nomination of its leader as deputy Prime 
Minister. As to avoid the loss of its traditional electorate, since 2000 the party has 
recovered some of the ideas of the MSI, albeit renewed and adapted to the new 
national and international context: the cult of law and order, the guiding role of the 
state in the economy, and the exaltation of social bonds in the national community. 
These ideas were not presented in the form of protest, but as a program consonant 
with a party called to the responsibilities of government. The conviction that in 
the Italian society was growing up a ”desire for the Right” based on the need for 
both identity and security, explains the search for a synthetic ideological formula, 
modernizing in some ways, conservative in others. In the meanwhile, Fini was trying 
to affirm himself as a serious and responsible conservative politician, now distancing 
himself from his old dream of reviving a ”Fascism of 2000”4 and in some cases by-
passing every kind of internal debate (the National Assembly met very rarely) to 
impose to the party new turns5. Fini was appointed as the official representative of the 
Italian government in the European Convention, endorsed the military attack against 
Iraq and, while taking a hard line on law and order (he call for the repression of the 
anti-G8 protesters in Genoa, and for the use of ”very severe” punishments for drug-
dealers), assumed more ”progressive” positions on other themes. More specifically, 
at the end of 2003 the party leader launched the proposal to provide legal immigrants 
with the right to vote at local elections, revised previous positions on ethical issues 
1 On this distinction see Robert S. KATZ, Peter MAIR, ”Changing Models of Party 
Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. V, 
no. 1, 1995, pp. 5-28.
2 ”Libero, forte, giusto. Il governo che vogliamo”, Patto di programma discusso nella 
Seconda Conferenza Programmatica di Alleanza Nazionale, Napoli, 23-25 febbraio 2001.
3 See Marco TARCHI, ”The political Culture of the Alleanza nazionale: An Analysis of 
the Party’s Programmatic Documents (1995-2002)”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. VIII, 
no. 2, 2003, pp. 135-181.
4 See Luca NEGRI, Doppifini: l’uomo che ha detto tutto e il contrario di tutto, Vallecchi, Firenze 
2010.
5 See Carlo RUZZA, Stefano FELLA, Re-inventing the Italian Right. Territorial Politics, 
Populism and ”Post-fascism”, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, pp. 153-158.
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opening to some libertarian options, retreated his statement on Mussolini, defined 
in 1994 as ”the greatest Italian statesman of the twentieth century” and, during an 
official visit to Jerusalem, he defined fascism as an ”absolute evil” because of its racial 
laws. Fini’s image as leader of a modern and moderate right-wing force was even 
more highlighted after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in November 
2004. However, the fact that, together with the Lega Nord’s leader Umberto Bossi, he 
had signed a bill on stricter immigration regulations provided reservations among the 
members of the European People’s Party over the perspective inclusion of Alleanza 
Nazionale MPs in its parliamentary group in Strasburg Assembly.
The break with the past was carried out mainly by the party leader but among its 
members the picture was less clear, displaying in some cases political attitudes close 
to the traditional MSI both in terms of authoritarian values and in the evaluation 
of the fascist regime: a difference that had been already emphasized by political 
scientists1. Despite increasing its external attractiveness by emphasizing the ”new 
course” of its program2, the political positions adopted by the party reflected only the 
choices of a very restricted inner circle of party leaders. AN was governed according 
to the principle of ”plebiscitary centralism”, in which the party leader (now called 
President), had almost absolute power over the internal decision-making bodies, 
appointed half of the members of the National Assembly, exerted full control over 
financing resources. The President also violated the party statute, which stipulated 
the need of organizing a conference every three years, whereas only three conferences 
took place from 1995 to 2009. This, however, did not prevent the flourishing of internal 
factions that competed for hegemony within the party, though Fini’s leadership was 
never questioned, and sought to influence ideologically the AN’s official position. 
This explains why the programmatic document presented at the 2002 National Party 
Congress was drafted by a committee made up of representatives of the three internal 
factions of the party.
Fini adopted the strategy of Divide et impera but such divisions raised notable 
friction within the party. The clear-cut negative judgment on fascism pronounced in 
Jerusalem provoked an uproar amongst the members and resulted into the departure 
of Alessandra Mussolini, who founded Alternativa Sociale (an umbrella coalition 
of extreme right parties including Forza Nuova and Fronte nazionale)3, Francesco 
Storace organized a public meeting to express the dissent of many AN members 
and three senior party leaders which had been or would be in the future Ministers, 
Altero Matteoli, Maurizio Gasparri and Ignazio La Russa, harshly criticized Fini’s 
attitudes (and, as a result, they were immediately removed from their office). The 
poor performance of the Centre-Right alliance in the 2005 regional elections where 
the House of Freedoms only won in Lombardy and Veneto – thanks to the Northern 
League, which had maintained its strongholds – increased the difficulties.
1 See Piero IGNAZI, ”Gianfranco Fini è in fuga ma il suo plotone arranca”, Il Mulino, 
vol. XLVII, no. 3, 1998, pp. 233-240.
2 See Mara MORINI, ”Movimento Sociale Italiano-Alleanza Nazionale”, in Luciano 
BARDI, Piero IGNAZI, Oreste MASSARI (eds), I partiti italiani, Università Bocconi Editore, 
Milano, 2007, pp. 149-174.
3 See Marco TARCHI, ”The Far Right Italian Style”, in Xavier CASALS (ed.), Political 
Survival on the Extreme Right, Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials, Barcelona, 2005, pp. 35-49. In 
the 1994 European elections, both Alternativa Sociale and the Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore 
obtained one seat at the Strasburg Parliament.
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The Risks of the ”Cold Fusion” and the Diaspora
The disagreements within the coalition, bringing forward the resignation of several 
ministers and the crisis of the second Berlusconi cabinet, immediately followed by the 
third one, suggested the Centre-Right to present itself at the 2006 general elections with 
a more articulated formula, emphasizing the peculiar programs tabled by FI, AN and 
CCD. The defeat, albeit by a narrow margin, left room to Fini to make further efforts of 
ideological repositioning to move towards the Centre, with the purpose of obtaining 
membership to the EPP1, even at the cost of causing the exit of the populist wing of 
Alleanza Nazionale, loyal to the MSI heritage, led by Storace, and of increasing the 
dissent of other cadres, who had already broke the dogma of the unanimous support 
for any leader’s decision, in force since the foundation of AN. The former president of 
Lazio Region founded in 2007 a new party, La Destra and some unsuccessful attempts of 
gathering together the fragmented milieu of the ”radical right” were organized.
Contrary to the Fini’s hopes, his strategy was soon hampered and overshadowed 
by Berlusconi’s invitation, in November 2007, to merge all the forces of the Centre-
Right into an unified party, il Popolo della Libertà. This move, inspired by the desire 
of counterweighing the birth, on the Centre-Left, of the Partito democratico, was 
at first strongly opposed by Fini, who wanted to increase his distance from the 
ally and declared to the press that the dissolution of Alleanza Nazionale and its 
confluence into the new subject was absolutely beyond dispute. But a few months 
later, under the pressure of elections just around the corner and the fear of loss of 
votes, widespread within his inner circle, he changed his mind and, contrary to his 
former ally Pierferdinando Casini, leader of the Unione di Centro (UCD, former CCD), 
agreed to run the race under a joint list under the new label. The vague identity of the 
new Berlusconi’s creature disappointed some of the voters that AN has previously 
attracted, so contributing both to the fairly good result of La Destra (2.4%) and to the 
growth of the Lega Nord (8.3%), but the success of the new strategy of the Centre-
Right was clear, as the PDL lists got 37.4% of the votes, 2% more than the overall score 
of FI and AN in 2006. Forced to admit the persisting hegemony of the Cavaliere on 
the moderate electorate, Fini did not accept the hypothesis of a federative agreement 
with the PDL, suggested by some of his followers, and held on 21-22 March 2009 a 
purely formal third Congress of the party to announce both the dissolution of Alleanza 
Nazionale and its merger into the new party.
The ”cold fusion”, despite the entry to government with four ministers, the 
election of Gianni Alemanno as mayor of Rome and the Fini’s appointment as 
President of the Chamber of Deputies, worsened previous rifts with the allies and 
created new ones. Within PDL, a party based on Berlusconi’s personal leadership, 
Fini was, for the first time in twenty years, no longer the number one – his official 
status was simply that of a ”co-founder” –, and his charisma was weakening among 
his followers. His reiterated anti-fascist statements had contributed to distance him 
from an increasing sector of the AN rank and file, and even some members of his 
inner circle were reluctant to subscribe his ”progressive” opinions on many issues2. 
1 See Piero IGNAZI, ”Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and 
Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord”, South European Society & 
Politics, vol. X, no. 2, 2005, pp. 333-349.
2 See Piero IGNAZI, ”La destra trionfante”, Il Mulino, vol. LVII, no. 4, 2008, pp. 432-440.
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As a result, the PDL parliamentarians and elected representatives in local institutions 
proceeding from AN split into two separate groups: Berlusconiani, close to the new 
leader, and Finiani, faithful for their historical leader. Incorporating party officials and 
members into the new party proved hard to implement due to the failure of sharing 
a common organizational structure: AN still had a large network of territorial units, 
whereas Forza Italia since its birth had adopted the model of the ”light party” with a 
very restricted structure1. Furthermore, the decision that 70% of political positions 
and electoral candidatures would be granted to former FI members whilst only 30% 
would be reserved to former AN members highlighted the inequality of treatment of 
both founding parties by increasing conflicts within the party.
Between 2008 and 2010, relations deteriorated between Berlusconi and Fini who, 
by taking advantage of his institutional role, repeatedly made public complaints 
against PDL’s political choices and Berlusconi’s personal behaviour. Fini’s strategy 
was more and more clear: having lost any hope of being appointed by the PDL leader 
as his successor, he was trying to gain credit as an impartial statesman, who could be 
accepted by the Centre-Left opposition as Prime Minister if Berlusconi would be forced 
to resign in consequence of a conviction in one or more of the judicial proceedings in 
which he had got involved. After a long series of conflicts, at the April 2011 National 
Committee of the party, Fini broke away from Berlusconi, who had become intolerant 
to his ally’s criticism, and was forced to quit the PDL2; but only 44 MPs and a limited 
number of local councillors followed him. Yet, Fini’s attempt to reunite all his former 
followers from Alleanza Nazionale, thus forcing Berlusconi to leave the lead of the 
government, failed. Many AN leading figures criticized the attitude of their former 
leader and confirmed their loyalty to the PDL.
In order to avoid the risk of isolation, Fini launched a new party, Futuro e Libertà 
per l’Italia (FLI), which was welcomed by Centrist and Centre-Left parties and media, 
but appeared as a traitor not only by Berlusconi but also by many members originating 
from MSI and AN. In October 2011 the FLI parliamentary group, along with all the 
other opposition groups, past a vote of no-confidence to the PDL-LN cabinet but the 
motion was rejected by a narrow majority. This defeat was a negative turning-point 
for Fini’s ambition, showing that his support was not enough to the opposition to 
form a new majority. Moreover the new party experienced internal troubles for the 
poor performance in the run-up to local elections and weakened by a constant trickle 
of defections, that caused the fragmentation of its MPs patrol: many of them split to 
form another parliamentary group, I responsabili, which supported the cabinet. The 
attempt to build a Centrist pole in a hypothetical ”Party of the Nation”, including 
the UDC and another moderate party, Alleanza per l’Italia (API), combined with a 
strong support for the Monti ”technical” government that followed the Berlusconi’s 
resignation in November 2011, did not avoid the rapid decline of Fini’s party. At 
the general elections of February 2013, Futuro e Libertà registered a disastrous 0.4% 
of votes, which sanctioned its exclusion from Parliament and its condemnation to 
become an irrelevant political actor.
1 See Emanuela POLI, Forza Italia. Strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2001.
2 See Susanna TURCO, Che fai, mi cacci? La sfida impossibile di Gianfranco Fini, Marsilio, 
Venezia, 2011.
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FLI was not the only victim of the neofascist diaspora. Fini’s controversial 
behaviour brought negative consequences to his former fellow members, sanctioning 
internal divisions among them. Within the PDL, the first group, loyal to Berlusconi, 
was marginalized and its presence reduced in the electoral lists. Other AN cadres, 
led by former ministers La Russa and Meloni, formed a new, more nationalist and 
right-wing party, Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), with the unawoved purpose of 
recreating the National Alliance, that with 1.9% of the vote acquired only nine elected 
members. La Destra did even more poorly by scoring only 0.6%. The lists of the Radical 
Right – Forza Nuova, CasaPound Italia, Movimento sociale-Fiamma tricolore – took on the 
whole only 0.4% of votes. Research suggests that many former MSI and AN followers 
shifted their votes to the populist movement headed by Beppe Grillo, attracted by 
its anti-establishment stances. Twenty years after Tangentopoli, the wave that had 
brought the ”National Right” from the margin of politics to the centre of power1 has 
now reached such a low ebb, leaving behind the rests of a long and controversial 
history. The inability to preserve its own identity as distinct amongst its allies, as well 
as in the eyes of its opponents, has destroyed the ambitions raised by the collapse of 
the old party system in 1993 among AN members and leaders.
In spite of the electoral disaster, however, not all the advocates of an autonomous 
Right force are resigned to choose between the abstention from the polls and the vote 
for one of the Center-Right parties (Forza Italia and Nuovo Centrodestra) where many 
of the AN cadres have found their home. Some projects have been presented by post-
fascist notables. Giorgia Meloni and Ignazio La Russa, leaders of Fratelli d’Italia, in 
order to enlarge their audience, have launched Officina per l’Italia, an open association 
which has organized a first meeting with some well-known personalities of the Right 
like the former AN MPs Gianni Alemanno, Adolfo Urso, Mario Landolfi and Silvano 
Moffa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Monti cabinet Giulio Terzi, and the anti-
Islamic journalist Magdi Allam. With an even more clear purpose of referring to a 
regretted past, Francesco Storace created the Movimento per l’Alleanza Nazionale. The 
rebirth of the ”social, popular and identitarian soul” of the Right is the basis of another 
initiative, the more radical Progetto per l’Italia. After the Fini’s eclipse, Roberto Menia 
is keeping FLI alive, while some of his former fellows animate the think-tank Fare 
futuro. Many other local groups appeal to the reunion of the fragmented post-fascist 
archipelago, but none of them seems, at the moment, to be up to this hard task.
Conclusions
After a long period of isolation caused by its identification with Fascism, the 
Italian Right emerged strongly from the ashes of the First Republic in 1993, beset 
by the scandals of Tangentopoli. The administrative elections of 1993 and the general 
election of 1994 showed that since there was no longer a Communist threat, a large 
part of the Italian public opinion tended to express conservative views, albeit in rather 
different ways. Disappointed with the corrupted ruling class, citizens were in search 
of new political forces. Forza Italia was especially appealing to anti-state ”liberal 
revolution” supporters. MSI-DN and then AN were popular amongst those citizens 
1 See Antonio CARIOTI, ”Dal ghetto al palazzo: l’ascesa di Alleanza Nazionale”, in Piero 
IGNAZI, Robert S. KATZ (eds), Politica in Italia. Edizione 95, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995, pp. 73-95.
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who wanted to reaffirm law and order policies, to call for an increased sense of the 
state and respond to threats to national identity (immigration, secessionist claims). 
CCD and CDU were seen with favour by the Catholic traditionalists.
The success of the Centre-Right coalition, despite this heterogeneity of expecta-
tions and perspectives, can be explained by two factors: the persistent hostility of 
a large sector of the Italian society against the Left and the presence of a unifying 
leader, a successful entrepreneur, who presented himself as a newcomer. Under these 
conditions, combined with the privileged condition of owning the Italian private 
TV companies Fininvest/Mediaset, Berlusconi managed for almost twenty years to 
maintain control over the fragile coalition he had founded. Such coalition had been 
repeatedly challenged by conflicting interests and ideological aspirations of each 
ally: after the break-up with Lega Nord, responsible for the electoral defeat of 1996, 
the frictions between FI, AN and CCD-CDU-UDC were frequent1, eased only by the 
prospect of returning to government between 2000 and 2001, and emerged still in 
the next five years along striking issues, such as economic policy, relations with the 
European Union and institutional reforms.
After 2006, with the defection of the UDC and the critics of populism launched 
by AN against the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, the instability of the coalition increased, 
but it was counterbalanced by the failure of the Unione, the incoherent coalition 
supporting the Prodi government, torn by serious internal conflicts. The success of 
the Centre-Right political alliance at the 2008 election mitigated only temporarily 
the internal tensions, triggered by Gianfranco Fini, sceptical about the opportunity 
to succeed Berlusconi as leader of PDL, but convinced, in the face of the economic 
crisis, of the possibility of being appointed to head a transitional government with 
the support of the Centre-Left. Between 2010 and 2011, Fini’s expectation failed: the 
creation of FLI was not enough to defeat Berlusconi government in Parliament, and 
when the weakness of the executive in dealing with the financial crisis forced the 
Cavaliere to resign from the Presidency of the Council, Mario Monti succeeded him 
at the head of a technical government. The support for Monti’s government was far 
from unanimous within the PDL: the party was close to division and its parliamentary 
majority was being gradually eroded, but also FLI was at pains after the coalition with 
centrist showed not to be a profitable alliance.
In the February 2013 General Election, PDL lost considerable support at the 
benefit of Scelta civica di Monti (Monti’s Civic List), but most significantly of the Five-
Star Movement, which had already in the 2012 local elections attracted Right-wing 
voters keen to oppose the rise of the Centre-Left parties. The Centre-Right, despite 
a poor showing, lost the election by an unexpected tiny margin, but the decline 
of bipolarism diminished its capacity of undertaking initiatives, condemning it to 
depend on the others’ actions and decisions, and the drastic reduction of candidates 
with an AN background in its list was an alarm bell for the ”national Right”. Without 
a new ruling class, with an evident shift of its coalition partners to the Centre, with its 
organizational network fragmented and weakened, the destiny of the Italian Right is 
uncertain, and will be influenced by factors difficult to control, first of them the future 
succession to Berlusconi and the fate of Forza Italia after his inevitable retirement. 
1 See Emanuela POLI, Marco TARCHI, ”The Parties of the Polo: united to What End?”, in 
David HINE, Salvatore VASSALLO (eds), Italian Politics. The Return of Politics, Berghahn Books, 
New York-Oxford, 2000, pp. 65-85.
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Given that, its potential electorate, according to the pollsters, is rather wide, although 
eroded by temporary defections and abstentions, and a deep process of renewal in the 
organizational structure and in the programmatic platform is deemed to take place 
soon or later. In what direction and by whom, it is rather arduous to predict under the 
current circumstances.
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ANNEX
Table 1
Main Right Parties in Italian General Elections, 1994-2013 – % of Vote
1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013
PDL 37,38 21,56 *
AN 13,47 15,66 12,02 12,34 - -
MS-FT  0,91  0,39  0,60 0,13











Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior. (*) Since 2008 Fi e An ran together as the Pdl. 
(**) In 2008 La Destra and MS-FT ran together. (***) In 2006 Forza Nuova and Fronte Nazionale ran 
together as Alternativa Sociale.
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